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WHAT TYPE OF FDI IS ATTRACTED BY BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES? 
 
Abstract 
Developing countries have increasingly engaged in Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) to 
attract foreign investors. While it is found that BITs are successful in attracting FDI, we argue 
that the effectiveness of BITs depends on the type of FDI. We find the effect of BITs to differ 
importantly across sectors of investment. FDI characterized by higher sunk investment costs 
responds more strongly to the signing of BITs. Given that the development impact of FDI differs 
according to the sector of investment, our results raise concerns on the effectiveness of BITs in 
attracting FDI in those sectors where it is considered most beneficial.  
 
Keywords 
investment treaties; foreign direct investment; sunk costs; Central and Eastern Europe; 
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WHAT TYPE OF FDI IS ATTRACTED BY BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES? 
1 INTRODUCTION 
After a period of reluctance towards foreign direct investment (FDI), since the 1980s developing 
countries have started opening up to international capital flows, animated by the widely accepted 
view that foreign investments foster development by creating employment, bringing technology 
and managerial know-how, and access to foreign markets. Countries started removing barriers to 
foreign entry in their markets, while implementing favorable policies and undertaking various 
investment promotion activities aimed at improving the attractiveness of their countries.  
Foreign investors often face significant uncertainty regarding the stability of these 
favorable conditions over time and have to consider that -even though investor-friendly policies 
were put in place to attract foreign investments- governments may have incentives to reverse 
course, for example by increasing taxes or by expropriating once investments have occurred.  
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) represent one of the main policy tools that 
governments have used to decrease the (perception of) investment risk and attract foreign 
investment. By signing a BIT the host country commits itself to fair and equitable treatment of 
foreign investors. The BIT guarantees compensation in case of expropriation and, most 
importantly, the host country submits to a binding external dispute settlement mechanism in case 
of disputes between investors and the state (UNCTAD, 1998). In this way, a BIT removes much 
of the uncertainty regarding basic ownership rights and the broader regulatory framework that 
foreign investors would otherwise face. 
Since the first BIT was signed between Germany and Pakistan in 1959, the number of 
such bilateral agreements has been rising very fast. Between 1990 and 2009, the number of BITs 
signed by developing countries increased from 200 to about 2000. Not surprisingly, this marked 
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evolution attracted the interest of researchers. The empirical findings on the effectiveness of 
BITs in attracting FDI are highly ambiguous. The use of different host country samples, dyadic 
or non-dyadic FDI flows, and different methods to account for the potential endogeneity of BITs 
have led to different conclusions
1
. Hallward-Driemeier (2003) finds little support for the 
effectiveness of BITs using bilateral FDI flows for a small sample of host countries. Using FDI 
flows aggregated over source countries and using a larger sample of host countries, Neumayer 
and Spess (2005) find a positive effect, with a stronger effect of BITs for countries with a weaker 
institutional quality. Most recent empirical studies using bilateral FDI flows and implementing 
more convincing methodologies to address for the endogeneity of BITs generally find that BITs 
do stimulate foreign investments (e.g. Egger and Merlo, 2007; Busse et al., 2010; Berger et al., 
2012). Using firm-level information for German investment abroad, also Egger and Merlo (2012) 
come to the conclusion that BITs generate and increase in FDI. 
One of the shortcomings of existing studies is that they all look at the impact of BITs on 
the overall FDI flows, aggregated over the different types of FDI. However, we argue that the 
key mechanisms through which BITs are thought to affect FDI, suggest that their effectiveness 
depends on specific characteristics of the investment project. Foreign investment projects 
involving larger sunk investments stand to lose more in case of expropriation, and are less likely 
to be undertaken in an uncertain environment. Also investment projects that are considered 
politically sensitive are more susceptible to policy reversals and expropriations. The extra 
protection provided by a BIT is therefore likely to disproportionally benefit these types of 
                                                     
1 For an overview of the literature, refer to Sauvant and Sachs (2009). 
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investments. With this chapter we aim to enrich the existing empirical literature by looking for 
the first time at the heterogeneous effects of BITs.  
Understanding which type of FDI is attracted by BITs is especially important because the 
development implications of foreign investments differ considerably across different types of 
FDI. This is emphasized in the most recent World Investment Report (UNCTADa, 2012), which 
introduces a Contribution Index as a first attempt to measure the contribution of foreign affiliates 
to value added, employment and wage generation, tax revenues, export generations etc.  
The expected impact of FDI on the host economy differs widely across sectors of FDI 
(Nunnenkamp, 2004). Foreign investments will contribute more to poverty alleviation when they 
are targeted at labor-intensive industries and when interactions with local firms can create 
spillovers of technology, managerial knowledge and trade networks, leading to higher 
productivity and, ultimately, to economic growth (OECD, 2002; Mayer-Foulkes and 
Nunnenkamp, 2009). Resource extraction activities generally tend to be capital intensive, 
consisting of continuous processes that are not divisible into discrete stages of production 
(UNCTAD, 2001). Foreign investment in resource extraction therefore tends to operate as 
“enclaves”, with little linkages to the local economy and a low contribution to economic 
development (Asiedu, 2004; Nunnenkamp, 2004; UNCTAD, 2012a). Investments in the 
manufacturing sector are believed to be most relevant for the diffusion of advanced technology 
(Xu, 2000), but also within manufacturing there may be important differences, as the extent of 
backward linkages with domestic suppliers are found to differ considerably across manufacturing 
industries (Javorcik, 2004), and spillovers may be limited if the type of manufacturing goods and 
technologies used have little in common with those of local firms (Kokko, 1994). In the tertiary 
sector the scope for dividing production into stages and subcontracting parts of production to 
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domestic firms is often limited. Still, in the retail and hotel sector there may be considerable 
potential for linkages with local input suppliers (UNCTAD, 2001). By studying how the effects 
of BITs differ across sectors, we will be able to better understand whether BITs successfully 
attract those foreign investments from which the largest contribution to the developing host 
countries can be expected.  
In order to analyze the heterogeneous effects of BITs across sectors, we use data on FDI 
stocks for 13 countries in the Former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe. While this 
relatively small dataset obviously imposes constraints on our empirical analysis as well as on the 
geographical representativeness of our results, it is the only available source of sectorally 
disaggregated FDI data that has been collected in a systematic way
2
. Moreover, the specific set 
of countries in our sample seems to be especially relevant for a study on BITs, both because 
these countries have increasingly engaged in signing investment treaties since the early 1990s, 
with 800 new BITs entering into force between 1990 and 2009, and because previous empirical 
studies have revealed that BITs may be particularly effective for transition economies. In a 
survey among managers by UNCTAD (2009), BITs were reported to be amongst the most 
important decision factors when undertaking FDI in transition countries, and more important 
than for developing countries. In the empirical studies by Busse et al. (2010) and Berger et al. 
(2012) the effect of BITs is found to be considerably smaller when excluding the transition 
                                                     
2 The US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) provides sectorally disaggregated information for US outward 
FDI, but – besides only being representative for US outgoing FDI – the data on FDI in mining and utilities 
contain a very large number of missing or non-disclosed observations while these are precisely two sectors of 
primary importance for testing our hypothesis. 
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countries from the sample, possibly because of the lack of credibility of unilateral measures 
immediately after the regime change. Moreover, by 2007, transition countries had been involved 
in 23% of all investor-state disputes, while they had received only 12% of the developing 
countries’ FDI stock (UNCTAD, 2012b-c). 
Our estimates for the overall effect of BITs are in line with the recent literature: their 
impact on the FDI stock is statistically significant and non-negligible, with one additional BIT 
increasing the stock of FDI by about 1 to 2 percent. But more importantly, our results show that 
there are large differences in the effectiveness of BITs across sectors: BITs appear particularly 
successful in attracting foreign investments in the utilities sector, real estate and mining, while no 
significant effect is found for investments in manufacturing and services. Given that the largest 
gains in terms of development for the host economies are expected from these latter sectors, our 
results cast some doubts on whether the success of the BITs signed so far have delivered the 
expected benefits to the host countries. 
In the next section we develop a conceptual framework that explains why we expect  the 
impact of BITs to differ across different sectors of FDI. The third section describes the data and 
section 4 discusses the empirical estimation strategy. Section 5 contains the results and section 6 
concludes. 
2 THE HETEROGENEOUS EFFECTS OF BITS ON FDI: CONCEPTUAL 
FRAMEWORK 
Scholars in the fields of law, politics and economics have described how BITs are hypothesized 
to impact foreign investors’ decisions. In this section we analyze conceptually how the effect of 
BITs could depend on the type of FDI and we formulate hypotheses regarding the sectors for 
which the impact of BITs can be expected to be larger.  
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(a) Bilateral investment treaties and investor incentives 
As mentioned in the introduction, BITs specify a number of guarantees to foreign investors, 
including the right to freely transfer funds and assets, minimum treatment standards and 
protection from expropriation. Expropriation does not only refer to the direct taking of physical 
private assets. Virtually all BITs also include protection against so-called ‘regulatory takings’, or 
‘indirect expropriations’, referring to regulatory acts taken by the host country that deprive 
investors of the value of their investment, such as changes in the taxation, regulatory measures, 
or governmental nonfeasance (Reisman and Sloane, 2004). The most crucial component of these 
treaties is the fact that the signatory partners submit to an international dispute settlement 
mechanism to ensure this protection (Elkins et al., 2006; Büthe and Milner, 2008; Kerner, 2009).  
The need for an external arbitration mechanism, which allows investors to bring claims of 
treaty violations to international arbitration tribunals (usually the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes, ICSID)
3
 is the result of a time inconsistency problem 
(Vernon, 1971; Simmons, 2000): in order to attract foreign investment, a government can assure 
investors that it will not expropriate the investments or raise taxes after the investment is made; 
yet, once the costs of investments are borne by the investors, a myopic host country government 
might find it optimal to breach its promises and extract rents or expropriate property or funds. 
Anticipating this behavior, investors will not trust the promises made by the government in the 
                                                     
3 ICSID was established in 1966 as a member of the World Bank Group. The primary purpose of ICSID is to 
provide facilities for conciliation and arbitration of international investment disputes between governments and 
private foreign investors. Other international investment arbitration tribunals are UNCITRAL (United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law) or SCC, which is part of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce. 
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first place and will refrain from investing in the country. This hold-up problem will thus 
ultimately lead to underinvestment (Büthe and Millner, 2008; Neumayer and Spess, 2005). By 
providing a credible commitment device, bilateral investment treaties aim at overcoming this 
problem, thereby reducing the risk of investment and, ultimately, attracting more FDI 
(Vandevelde, 1998; Elkins et al., 2006).  
The mechanism just described suggests that we should expect foreign investments that 
involve larger sunk costs and that are more susceptible to expropriation to react more strongly to 
the signature of a new BIT. A very simple example illustrates this. Suppose an entrepreneur 
considers a foreign investment project. Starting this project requires a capital investment of K in 
period 0. The project generates a net return R0 > 0 in period 0, and R1 > 0 in period 1. However, 
with a probability p –the determinants of which will be discussed in the next section- the host 
country will expropriate in period 1. In the case of expropriation, the investor will lose a share s 
of the invested capital K. We assume for now that p is known and only depends on host country 
characteristics, not on the type of the investment project.  Thus, the parameter s expresses the 
“sunkness” or “irreversibility” of the investment in case of expropriation. Ignoring discount rates 
or depreciation, the investment will take place if the expected net present value (NPV) of the 
investment project at t=0 is positive, or R0 + R1 – psK > 0. It is clear that, ceteris paribus, 
investments in higher risk countries (high p) or in sectors requiring a higher initial capital 
investment (high K) and a higher share of sunk costs (high s) are less likely to take place.  
In a context where investment can be postponed, the problem of underinvestment in the 
context of uncertainty becomes even larger, since even investments that are profitable in terms of 
net present value, may not be optimal to execute. As emphasized by Dixit and Pindyck (1994), 
all investment projects are at least to some extent characterized by irreversibility, but also by 
10 
 
uncertainty and the possibility to choose the timing of investment to some degree. This 
uncertainty can be related to the company’s market prospects, to uncertainty regarding the host 
country’s future policies, or regarding the risk of expropriation. It might therefore be more 
convenient for an investor to postpone the investment decision and re-evaluate it in a later 
period, even if the expected present return on investment is positive. The prospective investor is 
very much like the owner of a call option on the stock of some firm, contemplating whether to 
keep the option, versus exercising his right to buy the stock in return for an uncertain future 
return. To illustrate this, consider the case where the entrepreneur in the above example has the 
possibility of investing in period 0, as before, but has now also the alternative to postpone the 
investment decision until period 1, when he will know whether or not the government will 
expropriate. For instance, knowing that elections will take place and a new government will be 
elected, it might be optimal for the investor to wait till the result of the election is known. The 
investor may decide to invest only if the new government is more favorable towards foreign 
investors and will not expropriate, otherwise the investor will not invest. Thus, by postponing the 
investment till period 1, the investor foregoes the initial return R0, but also avoids the risk of 
expropriation. Investment in period 0 will then only take place if the payoff from investing in 
period 0 exceeds the payoff from waiting and investing in period 1 in case of no-expropriation, 
which happens with a probability (1-p). Thus, the investor will now invest in period 1 only if R0 
+ R1 - psK > (1-P) R1.  A larger probability of expropriation p defers investment by affecting the 
expected return (NPV), as before, but now also by increasing the value of waiting. Therefore, the 
problem of underinvestment for projects with a high initial capital investment and a high degree 
of sunk costs will be even larger in a context of political uncertainty.  
11 
 
Signing a BIT reduces s to 0 by committing to full compensation in the case of 
expropriation and by submitting to international arbitration in the case of disputes, and 
simultaneously reduces the expropriation risk p, since expropriation becomes less profitable to 
the host country. As a result, a BIT directly increases the expected net present value of the 
investment and leads to more FDI. Moreover, by removing uncertainty regarding the future 
return on investment, BITs reduce the value of postponing the investment decision for foreign 
investors, leading to an additional increase in FDI. While this effect might be negligible in 
sectors with little sunk investment costs, it is likely to be important in sectors with high sunk 
costs and it seems reasonable to expect a heterogeneous impact of BITs across different sectors 
of the economy. 
(b) Government incentives to expropriate 
The capital requirement and the level of sunkness discussed above are not the only dimensions 
that vary between sectors. The risk of expropriation p itself may vary as well: the more valuable 
the investment is for the host country government, the more inclined the government will be to 
expropriate it.  
Existing studies confirm that the risk of expropriation varies across sectors, with the most 
frequent targets being investments in natural resource extraction, utilities, mass communications, 
and (in the 1960s and 70s) banking (Truitt, 1970; Kobrin, 1980). Table 1, which is taken from 
Hajzler (2012), shows the share of each sector in the number of expropriation acts
4
 by 
                                                     
4 An expropriation act is defined as the involuntary disinvestment of assets of any number of direct investment 
firms, within a given industry and in a given year. This only concerns direct expropriations. Hence, ‘indirect 
expropriations’ or ‘regulatory takings’ are not considered here. Expropriation acts in the real estate sector are 
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developing countries between 1960 and 2006. Note that the sector of real estate was not 
considered in these studies. Moreover, these numbers refer only to direct expropriations, and do 
not include indirect expropriations. As a result these figures may underestimate the frequency of 
(direct and indirect) expropriation acts for sectors that are sensitive to adverse regulatory changes 
rather than to direct expropriations, such as the banking sector which is directly influenced by 
governments’ monetary policy.  
[Table 1 about here] 
While most expropriation acts are concentrated in the 1960s and 1970s (which 
corresponds to the period of colonial independence), the number of expropriations has increased 
again since 1995, mostly in Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe. Expropriation is 
clearly most prevalent in the primary sector. Communication and utilities also account for a 
considerable share of the expropriation acts, especially relative to their share in total FDI stock in 
developing countries of less than 10% (UNCTAD, 2012b). Given that the manufacturing sector 
makes up more than half of the total stock of foreign investment in developing countries, the 
share of expropriations in the manufacturing sector appears to be very low. 
What determines these differences in expropriation risk across sectors? Three main 
explanations have been put forward in the literature (Hajzler, 2012). The first one relates to the 
importance of sunk costs, which is especially clear in resource extracting industries and utilities 
provision. For example, mineral extraction requires large investments in exploration and 
                                                                                                                                                                           
not reported separately, and are included in ‘Other services’. The number of expropriation acts was collected by 
Kobrin (1987), Minor (1994) and Hajzler (2012) from reports of expropriations published in a wide range of 
periodicals. For more details refer to the appendix of Hajzler (2012). 
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excavation infrastructure before revenues are realized. Once the profitability and the quality of 
mineral deposits is clear, expropriation becomes particularly profitable for the government, 
referred to as the ‘obsolescing bargain’ (Vernon, 1971). Similarly, the utilities sector is 
characterized by high fixed start up costs and relatively low variable costs. Thus, while an 
investor in these sectors takes a high risk by making a large sunk cost while the returns will only 
pay off later, as was illustrated above, it is this same feature that makes it interesting for a 
government to reap the returns once this sunk cost is made.  
The second explanation is linked to the firm-specificity of foreign owned knowledge and 
capacities. Governments can indeed only expropriate capital, but not more immaterial and firm-
specific factors of production such as foreign managerial expertise, which may be especially 
important in many manufacturing and service industries (Eaton and Gersovitz, 1984; Raff, 
1992). The returns from investments in sectors where firm-specific knowledge is important 
might therefore be considerably lower for the government than for the foreign company and, as a 
consequence, the government will have less incentives to expropriate. Kobrin (1980) provides 
empirical support for this hypothesis, finding a negative effect of firm-specific knowledge on the 
probability of expropriation.  
Finally, foreign ownership might be politically sensitive in certain sectors and therefore 
more prone to expropriation. Extractive industries, utilities, railways, communications and 
national defense are often seen as important to political and economic independence and national 
security (Kobrin, 1980; Shafer, 2009). Utilities might be considered as basic provisions that 
should be in public ownership, while natural resources are considered to be owned by the host 
country and their exploitation by foreign nationals may easily encounter protests, especially 
when a period of overall poor economic performance in the host country coincides with a period 
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of prosperity in industries that are dominated by foreign owned firms (Kobrin, 1984; Jodice, 
1980). Moreover, a sudden increase in mineral prices may result in governments wanting to 
renegotiate contracts that are suddenly perceived as much more generous to the investor than 
expected (Duncan, 2006; Engel and Fischer, 2010). Investments in these sectors are therefore 
likely to face high risks of expropriations or policy reversals. 
Overall, this analysis indicates that investments in sectors that require high sunk capital 
investments, have a low degree of firm-specific skills, and that are more politically sensitive face 
relatively higher expropriation risks, and are therefore expected to be disproportionally affected 
by BITs. 
(c) Dispute settlement 
A first indication that the relevance of BITs may indeed vary across sectors of the economy can 
be found in the records of investor-state dispute settlement cases at the international investment 
arbitration courts (mostly ICSID) between 1987 and 2010 (UNCTAD, 2012b). The increasing 
number of BITs signed resulted in an increased number of claims laid down at the international 
arbitration courts over that time period. Figure 1 illustrates the share of each sector in the total 
number of investor state disputes laid down since 1987 and compares it to the share of the 
sectors in the global FDI stock. 
 [Figure 1 about here] 
Unsurprisingly, the pattern derived from the disputes is largely similar to the one 
observed based on the number of expropriation acts in Table 1. Given that acts of expropriation 
are more likely to occur in certain sectors than in others (as was illustrated in Table 1), it is not 
surprising that also investment disputes more often concern investments in these sectors.  
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The utilities sector accounts for 23.6% of total disputes, while accounting for only 1.4% 
of the stock of foreign investments in developing countries. Also the share in total investor-state 
disputes of mining, agriculture, and real estate (respectively 14.0, 9.6 and 7.0%) is high 
compared to their share in global FDI stock (respectively 7.7, 0.2 and 1.3%). The number of 
disputes concerning investments in the manufacturing sector is non-negligible (18.2% of 
disputes), but is very low when considering that manufacturing makes up 32% of the FDI stock. 
It is also important to note that within manufacturing, 35% of arbitration cases relate to 
investment in chemicals, oil refineries and steel production, which are the industries with the 
highest sunkness proxies within that sector (see Figures A2a and b). Also disputes regarding 
investments in private services or banking are less frequent (respectively 11.5 and 14% of 
disputes) relative to their share in FDI stock (30% and 26%). Note that while Table 1 only 
considered direct expropriations, disputes laid down at the international arbitration courts can 
also concern ‘indirect expropriations’. This may explain why the share of the banking sector in 
these investment disputes is higher than its share in the records of direct expropriations described 
in Table 1.  
Based on the arguments above on investor and government incentives, sectoral 
differences in sunk costs, knowledge specificity and political sensitivity, the actual figures on the 
frequency of expropriations, and number of arbitration cases on the sectoral level, we 
hypothesize that FDI in certain sectors may be more responsive to the signature or ratification of 
a BIT than in other sectors. A first goal of the empirical part of our paper will be to quantify 
these differences by estimating the effect of BITs on the sectoral level.  
The irreversibility of the investment emerged as a key determinant both of investor’s 
sensitivity to a given expropriation risk and of the government’s incentives to expropriate. 
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Therefore, a second goal will be to develop proxies for investment irreversibility and investigate 
to what extent differences in these measures can explain the observed differences in the effect of 
BITs on investment.   
Before showing the empirical strategy and results of this analysis, the next section 
describes the dataset, and the construction of proxies for investment irreversibility. 
3 DATA DESCRIPTION  
(a) Datasets 
Our sample consists of FDI data for 7 different sectors in 13 countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe and the Former Soviet Union over the period 1994-2009. Table A1 gives an overview of 
the countries and years covered in the dataset. We use data on FDI stocks disaggregated by 
industry, collected by the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW, 2010). We 
have classified industries into seven economic sectors: agriculture and fisheries (further referred 
to as agriculture), mining, manufacturing, banking, real estate, utilities, and other private 
services. Table A2 shows which industries are considered in each of the sectors. Given that FDI 
data are missing for the agricultural sector in Slovenia and the Slovak Republic, this results in 88 
country-sector cross-sectional units, with an average of 11 years of observations per cross-
sectional unit
5
.  Figure A1 illustrates the evolution of the FDI stock per sector over time for each 
country separately.  
                                                     
5 See Table A1 for an overview of the countries and time periods considered in the analysis and Table A2 for the 
list of industries included in each of the seven sectors.  
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Table 2 indicates the mean, minimum and maximum volume of the FDI stock in each 
sector for the countries in our sample and shows the share of each sector in the total FDI stock. 
With on average 34.5 percent of the total FDI stock, manufacturing is the most important sector 
for foreign investments for the countries in our sample, followed by private services with 23.8 
percent and banking with 18.1 percent. Note that the share of FDI in the agriculture, mining and 
utilities sector is low for all countries in our sample.  
As a robustness test, in the second part of our analysis we make use of the industry 
disaggregation of FDI which is available for the manufacturing sector. We use FDI stocks for 12 
different manufacturing industries in 12 countries (for Bulgaria industry-disaggregated data is 
missing). Since information on certain industries is missing for some countries, this results in 
122 cross-sectional units and 9 time observations on average. 
[Table 2 about here] 
The dependent variable of our analysis will be the total stock of FDI in the host country 
in a certain sector, aggregated over the different home countries of investment. The literature has 
sometimes relied on dyadic FDI data (home-host country pairs) (e.g. Egger and Merlo, 2007; 
Busse et al., 2010), but the lack of FDI data that are disaggregated at the same time by home 
country and by sector does not allow us to do the same. However, there are valid arguments for 
not differentiating FDI by the countries of origin. By signing a BIT, a country commits to the 
protection and fair treatment of investors of the signatory partner only. Therefore one can argue 
that only investors from the country that is signing the treaty are expected to react to it. To 
properly measure this direct “commitment effect”, dyadic FDI data are required. However, even 
though not protected by the BIT themselves, foreign investors may consider a BIT as an easily 
observable and credible signal that the host country is serious about attracting and protecting 
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FDI. The more BITs a country engages in, the stronger this signal is (Kerner, 2009). A BIT 
might thus not only encourage investment from the signatory partner, but there may also be a 
positive indirect effect on investments from other countries
6
. It can therefore be argued that a 
dyadic approach may underestimate the effect of BITs on FDI, because it ignores this indirect 
“signaling effect” (Neumayer and Spess, 2005; Tobin and Rose-Ackerman, 2011).  
Information on the signing and ratification of BITs is taken from UNCTAD’s IIA 
database (UNCTAD, 2012b). For each host country, we construct the total number of BITs that 
are ratified in a particular year as the explanatory variable of interest. We use the number of 
ratified BITs rather than the number of BITs that are signed, because between the moment of 
signature and ratification of the treaty several years may pass, and it is only upon  ratification 
that the BITs enters into force and that actual commitments are made
7
. As a robustness check, we 
will replicate the regressions using the number of signed BITs and show that our main 
conclusions hold.  
Figure A1 in appendix shows the number of BITs signed by each of the host countries in 
our sample over the period 1994-2009. By 2009, the countries in our sample had signed BITs 
                                                     
6 Using a dyadic dataset, Kerner (2009) estimates how bilateral FDI flows react to a BIT signed between the host 
and the investors’ home country (commitment effect) and to BITs signed between the host country and another 
country (signaling effect). He finds evidence for both, the magnitude being considerably larger for the 
commitment effect, as expected.  
7 Moreover, states tend to publish the text of treaties and submit them to the United Nations only after 
ratification, making it difficult to obtain information on the specific provisions before ratification (Yackee, 
2008). 
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with on average 48 countries. Each country engaged in BITs with at least 15 EU member states, 
and all except Hungary had ratified a BIT with the United States. With respectively 72 and 62 
BITs, Romania and Czech Republic are the countries with the largest number of BITs in force by 
2009, while Estonia and Macedonia engaged in only 23 and 28 BITs respectively.  
We will include a number of control variables that can explain variation in FDI and that 
are collected from different sources (see the next section for details on their selection). Data on 
the monthly wage in manufacturing are taken from ILO (ILO, 2012). Political institutional 
quality is measured through the Political Constraint Index (Henisz, 2006), which is a composite 
index of variables measuring the political structures and their ability to support credible 
commitments. It ranges from 0 to 1, with a higher value indicating better institutions
8
. The 
inflation rate and the measure of trade openness (sum of exports and imports relative to GDP) are 
taken from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2012).  
(a) Measuring sunkness across sectors 
Sunk costs are difficult to measure precisely and therefore we will use two proxies that have 
been proposed in the literature. The first proxy is the average fixed capital stock per firm in the 
sector. The industrial organization literature describes the role of sunk costs as barriers to entry 
and their impact on firm size and industry structure (Tirole, 1989). High fixed capital 
                                                     
8 Since the Political Constraints Index is only available till the year 2007, we set the values for 2008 and 2009 
equal to those in 2007. Alternative indicators of political institutional quality suggest that compared to the 
period before there were little changes in those two years. Our results are in any case robust to the use of 
alternative indicators such as the Freedom House Index (FHI) (Freedom House, 2012), or the Polity 2 variable 
(Polity IV, 2012), as well as to the joint inclusion of the three indicators. 
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requirements are more likely to lead to markets with relatively fewer and larger firms (Ghosal 
and Loungani, 2000). Following Lambson and Jensen (1998) and Gschwandtner and Lambson 
(2002), we therefore use the average capital stock per firm, calculated as total real fixed capital 
stock in the sector over a certain time period divided by the average number of firms in the 
sector. 
The second proxy for sunk costs is the capital-labor ratio as proposed in Cabral (1995) 
and used for example in Pennings and Sleuwagen (2000) and Gschwandtner and Lambson 
(2002). Since sunk costs are probably higher in more capital-intensive industries than they are in 
labor-intensive industries, our second proxy is the capital-labor ratio for each sector, calculated 
as the average total real fixed capital stock in the sector over a certain time period, divided by the 
average number of workers in the sector over that time period.  
These are certainly not perfect measures for irreversibility. Both proxies may 
overestimate sunk costs, since they ignore the depreciation and the scrap value of capital. On the 
other hand, some intangible and recurring sunk costs, such as market research, legal fees, 
advertising costs etc. are not included in our capital measure. Nevertheless, we believe that - in 
the absence of detailed firm-level data on sunk costs - these are good approximations and both 
proxies yield qualitatively very similar results. 
Both proxies are constructed based on the micro-data and capital and labor accounts in 
the EUKLEMS (2011) database. Since complete data is only available for a limited number of 
countries and years, we constructed both proxies for Germany, which is the largest capital 
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exporter to the countries considered in our analysis
9
. Based on the available data, the capital-
labor ratio is averaged over the period 1997-2007 and the capital per firm-proxy is averaged over 
the period 1991-1997. Because data are missing on the number of firms active in the real estate 
sector in Germany, we replaced the value of the average capital per firm in the German real 
estate sector by its corresponding value in The Netherlands. Our results are robust to excluding 
the real estate sector entirely, or using the value in The Netherlands for all sectors. 
The value of these proxies for each of the seven sectors that will be considered in our 
empirical analysis are presented in Figures 2a and 2b. Our proxies confirm the intuition that 
utilities and real estate, and to a lesser extent also mining and banking, have the highest degree of 
irreversibility. In light of our previous analysis, this would suggest that investors in these sectors 
are more susceptible to uncertain investment environments and would respond more strongly to a 
credible reduction of this uncertainty through a BIT.  The services sector has the lowest value for 
both proxies and investment in this sector therefore is predicted to be less sensitive to the 
introduction of a BIT.   
[Figure 2a and b about here] 
  
                                                     
9 Note that this capital-labor ratio may be a slight overestimation of the true capital-labor ratio for the activities 
by foreign-owned firms in Central and Eastern Europe compared to domestic companies in Germany because of 
the relatively lower labor cost in these host countries. Therefore we tested the robustness of our results using 
the capital-labor ratio for Czech Republic, which in turn might be a slight underestimation, and found all our 
conclusions to remain valid.    
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4 EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION 
We will use fixed effects models to estimate the effect of BITs on FDI stocks, thereby effectively 
considering the impact of an extra BIT on the change in the FDI stock within a host country. 
Given that it takes some time for FDI to adjust, and in order to reduce simultaneity problems at 
least to some extent, the explanatory variables are lagged by one year
10
. We start off with the 
following static specification, reported in column (1) in the results tables: 
 
                                         
with                               
 
Here, the subscript i indicates the host country, s indicates the sector and t indicates the 
year. The error term is composed of an idiosyncratic component      and a country-sector 
specific fixed effect    . Year dummies    are included to capture eventual common shocks in 
FDI across host countries
11
. The FDI variable (      ) is the logarithm of FDI stock in country i, 
sector s and year t. Then we introduce a lagged dependent variable as an explanatory variable to 
                                                     
10 Lagging all explanatory variables or only the BIT variable by two years instead of one in order to anticipate 
that FDI may react slowly, does not alter our main results.  
11 For example, 8 countries in our sample accessed the EU in 2005 and two countries followed later. Year 
dummies largely account for this. Our results are robust to including post-EU-agreement and post-EU-accession 
dummies. These variables are found not to contribute significantly to explaining foreign investment flows and 
are therefore not included in the final model.  
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account for the sluggish adjustment of FDI stocks. The resulting dynamic fixed effects model 
(column 2) takes the following form:  
                                                 
with                               
 
This lagged value of FDI allows us to take into account the sluggish adjustment of FDI over time 
and its coefficient is expected to be positive and smaller than one.  
The explanatory variable of interest is the total number of BITs (     ) ratified by host 
country i in year t. In a first set of regressions, we analyze the effect of an additional BIT being 
ratified without allowing the effect to differ across sectors (hence     ), which corresponds to 
the functional form that has been analyzed in earlier studies. Second, in order to determine 
whether BITs attract more FDI in certain sectors than in others, we estimate a BIT effect    for 
each sector separately. Finally, to capture what we think is the main explanation for the 
differential effect of BITs across sectors, we will interact the BIT variable with the de-meaned 
indicator of the irreversibility of investment for each sector, allowing the effect of a BIT to 
change linearly as a function of the relative sunkness in a sector using the average capital cost 
per firm as a proxy for the importance of sunk costs. We test the robustness of our results to 
using the capital-labor ratio as a proxy. While we use the number of BITs ratified in our basic 
specifications, we also test the robustness of our results to using the number of BITs signed, 
which we expect to have a smaller impact on FDI. In addition, we repeat the estimation using the 
number of BITs ratified with the top 15 capital exporters. We expect the effect of BITs to be 
larger when the signatory partner is a country with a large stock of outward FDI. 
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The vector     consists of a standard set of explanatory variables of FDI. We include the 
logarithm of the real monthly wage, which can be interpreted as a proxy for labor cost - in which 
case the expected coefficient would be negative - but it can also be considered a measure for 
purchasing power or it might capture the productivity of the labor force - in which case we 
would expect a positive coefficient. Which of these effects is most important for FDI is an 
empirical question. The level of GDP per capita is omitted because of multicollinearity with the 
wage variable. An increase in the real wage over time can thus equally well be interpreted as an 
indicator of economic growth. Inflation is often used as an indicator of macroeconomic stability, 
and high inflation would be expected to reduce foreign investments. However, while high levels 
of inflation are found to be bad for growth, at low levels the effect on growth is often found to be 
positive (Fischer, 1993; Kahn and Senhadji, 2001). As a result, we have no strong hypothesis on 
the sign of the coefficient. To account for this non-linearity to some extent, we include the 
logarithmic transformation of the inflation variable. A higher degree of trade openness is 
expected to lead to an increase in FDI. Finally, a higher value of the Political Constraints Index 
corresponds to a higher quality of political institutions and a positive coefficient is expected. 
While our dynamic fixed effects model takes into account the fact that FDI stocks adjust 
slowly, it brings along another problem. The inclusion of the lagged values of the dependent 
variable in a fixed effects estimation causes indeed the so-called ‘Nickell bias’ (Nickell, 1981). 
To address this problem we resort to the GMM (General Method of Moments) estimator (column 
4 in the results tables) proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991)
12
. In particular, we use the forward 
                                                     
12 Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) also proposed a system GMM approach in which in 
addition lagged first-differences are used as instruments for the levels. However, the last approach imposes the 
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orthogonal deviations transformation (Arellano and Bover, 1995) in which the transformed 
‘differences to the future mean’ are instrumented with past levels of the dependent variable13. In 
our basic specification we will use lags 2 to 4 and in order to limit the number of instruments, we 
collapse the instrument matrix (Roodman, 2009a). We report the test statistic for the joint 
validity of instruments: the Sargan tests of over-identifying restrictions, which holds in most of 
our specifications
14
. We will also prove the robustness of our results to using different lag 
structures. 
Finally, we attempt to address concerns about the potential endogeneity bias in the BIT 
coefficient. The direction of such bias is not a priori clear. The conclusion of BITs being signed 
may be (partially) determined by investors lobbying for protection of existing or planned 
investment projects. Such reverse causality would lead to an overestimation of the real effect. On 
the other hand, if BITs are more likely to arise in those host countries in which foreign 
investments flows in at a slower rate compared to other host countries, for instance because of a 
                                                                                                                                                                           
additional assumption of stationarity of the dependent variable (Roodman, 2009b), which is unlikely to hold for 
FDI stocks in a period of increasing FDI inflows. 
13 The orthogonal deviations transformation removes the fixed effects by subtracting from each observation in 
t=1,… T-1, the mean of all the remaining future transformations. This minimizes data loss compared to the 
more commonly used first difference transformation in which both     and       are missing for a missing 
value of   . 
14 The Sargan test is passed for all except one of our main specifications (see Table 5 (5)). For this one 
specification, an alternative lag structure does pass the Sargan test and provides very similar estimates (see Table 
A4 in Annex). 
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lack of credibility, poor infrastructure or poorly developed markets
15
, and if this slower build-up 
of FDI is not fully captured by the control variables, we would underestimate the effect. Note 
that even if we would not succeed in entirely removing endogeneity and estimate the precise 
causal effect, this does not undermine our main argument. If investors in high sunk cost sectors 
are more likely to lobby, this would suggest that our estimated effect partly reflects the fact that a 
BIT is more likely to arise when high sunk investments are already planned anyway. Hence, 
even if our estimate reflects a correlation rather than causality, it remains the case that this 
correlation is found to be higher for sectors with a high degree of irreversibility than for other 
sectors, which is our main point.   
Nevertheless we will make use of two different strategies to solve these potential 
endogeneity problems and obtain a precise estimate of the causal impact of BITs. First, we add a 
country-time trend to the dynamic fixed effects specification (column 3), in addition to the 
country-sector fixed effects, to control for potential different growth paths of FDI stocks across 
countries when estimating the effectiveness of BITs. Second, in addition to instrumenting the 
lagged dependent variable, we also instrument the BIT variable in the GMM estimation, using 
lags 2 to 4 (column 5).  
To summarize, in order to properly take into account the evolution of FDI stocks over 
time and to tackle the different econometric issues, we will report results for five different 
econometric specifications, in which we progressively refine our estimation strategy: (1) static 
OLS fixed effects model, (2) dynamic OLS fixed effects model, (3) dynamic OLS fixed effects 
                                                     
15 Neumayer (2006) finds that developed countries are more likely to sign a BIT with developing countries that 
are poorer and where investment protection is weak. 
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model including country-time trends, (4) GMM orthogonal transformation in which the lagged 
dependent variable is instrumented, (5) GMM orthogonal transformation in which the lagged 
dependent variable and the BIT variable are instrumented. 
5 RESULTS 
Table 3, 4 and 5 represent our main results. Table 3 shows the estimated effect of BITs on FDI 
stocks, without allowing the effect to differ across sectors. The results in Table 4 include a BIT 
effect for each sector separately. In Table 5, the BIT variable is interacted with the degree of 
sunkness of each sector. 
Table 3 shows the results for specifications (1) to (5) with a common BIT effect across 
sectors. First of all, as expected, the dynamic models reveal the strong dependency in FDI stocks 
over time
16
. Bilateral investment treaties are found to have a significant positive impact on FDI 
stocks in specification (1) to (4). In specification (5) BITs are not found to significantly increase 
FDI, although p-values vary between 0.09 and 0.25 depending on the specification of lag 
structures. Based on specifications (3) and (5), which are thought to account best for endogeneity 
bias, we estimate that ratifying a new BIT increases FDI stocks by about 1 to 2 percent.  
 [Table 3 about here] 
                                                     
16 Note that a pooled dynamic OLS regression without fixed effects (not shown) generates a coefficient of 0.9. 
The GMM estimate lies in between the pooled OLS and the dynamic FE estimate, which is in line with the 
theoretical prediction that the pooled OLS estimate is upwards biased and the dynamic FE estimate downwards 
biased. 
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A higher monthly wage is associated with an increase in the stock of FDI, suggesting that 
an increase in purchasing power and labor productivity (and per capita growth in general), rather 
than low labor costs, explain the inflow of foreign investment. Probably the wage gap between 
investors’ home countries and the host countries in our sample remained large, such that an 
increase in monthly wages in CEE and FSU did not negatively affect decisions to relocate 
production activities to these countries which were based on labor cost differentials. This is in 
line with Konings and Murphy (2006), who find no evidence that low labor costs are the drivers 
for multinational companies to relocate activities to Central and Eastern Europe. Political 
institutional quality is found to have a positive and significant effect on FDI in the static model, 
but once considering the dynamic nature of FDI stock, the significance disappears in most 
specifications. The effect of inflation is positive in the GMM regressions, but is not robust across 
specifications. For trade openness a positive and robustly significant coefficient is found.  
While these results confirm that BITs succeed in attracting FDI, the actual purpose of this 
chapter is to analyze whether the effectiveness of BITs varies across sectors. Table 4 shows the 
estimated effect of BITs for each sector of investment separately. Consistently over all 
specifications, the estimated coefficients on the BIT variable are larger for FDI in utilities and 
real estate, banking, mining, and agriculture (ordered from the highest to the lowest estimate) 
than they are for manufacturing and services. The effect of BITs on FDI in real estate, utilities 
and banking is robustly significant over all empirical specifications
17
. For manufacturing and 
services the estimated coefficient is mostly not significantly different from zero. The estimates 
                                                     
17 For banking the last coefficient is not significantly different from zero at conventional significant levels, but 
has an associated p-value of 0.19. 
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for mining and agriculture are positive and larger in magnitude compared to manufacturing and 
services, but significance is less robust. Note that these last two sectors also have the smallest 
share in total FDI and not all countries are equally endowed with resources for agriculture or 
mining. It is obvious that improved investment protection can only lead to a substantial increase 
in FDI in mining, if there are considerable reserves of natural resources. If the impact of a BIT 
varies largely across countries because of different resource endowments, this may explain why 
the estimate is measured with more error. The estimates on the lagged dependent variable and the 
control variables are similar to those in Table 3. 
 [Table 4 about here] 
As a next step in our analysis, we analyze whether the degree of irreversibility of 
investments in these economic sectors provide a plausible explanation for the differences in 
effectiveness of BITs across sectors, by interacting the BIT variable with a proxy for the 
importance of sunk costs in each sector (Table 5). In our basic specification we use the capital 
stock per firm as a proxy, while Table A3 in appendix the shows that results are robust to using 
the capital-labor ratio instead. In all specifications, sectors with a higher degree of sunk costs are 
found to be more responsive to a BIT. The coefficient on the BIT variable should be interpreted 
as the marginal effect of an additional BIT for a sector with the average level of fixed capital 
stock per firm. Based on specifications (3) and (5) this effect would correspond to an increase in 
FDI stock by about 2.3%. We calculate the effect of a BIT for a sector with a capital stock per 
firm at the  lowest decile to be 1.1% (though not significantly different from zero), while for a 
sector with a capital stock per firm at the highest decile, an additional BIT is estimated to 
increase the FDI stock by 3.9%.  
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In addition to these basic results, which confirm our hypotheses, we perform a number of 
robustness tests to verify the sensitivity of our results to alternative specifications. Table 6 
reports the results for specification (3) only, which corresponds to the dynamic fixed effects 
model including country-time trends, but our main conclusions remain valid over the other 
specifications as well. In the first two columns of Table 6, we report the results when using the 
date of signature rather than the date of ratification to construct the total number of BITs in each 
year. As expected, the estimates are lower when using the date of signature and the coefficients 
for the sector-specific BIT coefficients lose significance, although the variation in the magnitude 
of coefficients across sectors corresponds to the earlier results. We do find that the effect of 
signing an extra BIT increases significantly with the importance of sunk costs in the sector, but 
the coefficient on the interaction term is smaller than it was when using the number of BITs 
ratified.  
When we use the number of BITs ratified with the top 15 capital exporters (columns 3 an 
4 of Table 6), we find larger coefficients than in the basic specifications, as expected. BITs are 
found to be effective for investments in real estate, utilities, and banking. Again, a higher degree 
of sunk costs corresponds to a larger effect of an additional BIT, and this effect is larger when it 
concerns a BIT with a major capital exporter.  
 [Table 5 about here] 
 [Table 6 about here] 
Given that the large sector of manufacturing is composed of industries with very different 
degrees of irreversible investments, we test whether these different levels of irreversibility affect 
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the effectiveness of BITs also for manufacturing industries (Table 6, last column)
18
. In the same 
way as was done for sectors, we calculate the capital-labor ratio and the capital cost per firm for 
each industry and interact this with the BIT variable. The last column of Table 6 shows the 
results. While for the average level of sunkness, the effect of a BIT on investment in 
manufacturing for industries with an average fixed capital stock per firm is about zero (see also 
the result for manufacturing in Table 4), we find that for manufacturing industries with a high 
degree of sunk costs BITs do seem to matter, with a BIT effect of 1.5 percent for manufacturing 
industries operating at the 90
th
 percentile of the average fixed capital stock per firm. 
Finally, robustness of our basic results to alternative specifications of the GMM approach 
was tested. Table A4 in appendix reports the results using lags 2 to 3 and lags 2 to 6, with the 
BIT variable considered endogenous. Although it needs to be noted that not all these 
specifications pass the Sargan test, the estimated coefficients are similar and our main 
conclusions seem to be robust. 
 
Overall, our results provide some evidence for BITs having a positive effect on FDI in 
general, which is in line with the most recent studies showing that BITs are effective, and 
especially so in transition countries (Busse et al., 2010; Berger et al., 2012). While a significant 
                                                     
18 The limited size of our sample did not allow to estimate an industry-specific BIT effect, as we did for the 
sectors, therefore only the model with the BIT variable interacted with the degree of sunkness was estimated. 
Robustness of these industry-level results to using the GMM specifications could not be tested in a reliable way 
as the Sargan tests pointed to severe problems of instrument validity.  
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effect on FDI in general, however, is not robust to all specifications, an interesting pattern shows 
up when allowing the effectiveness of BITs to vary across the type of FDI.  
Our results show that FDI in utilities, real estate and to a lesser extent in banking and 
mining reacts most strongly to a new BIT entering into force, while for manufacturing and 
services no significant effect was found. One additional BIT is estimated to increase the FDI 
stock in utilities by 2.5 to 4%, in real estate by 1 to 3.3% and in banking by about 0.8 to 2.3%. 
For mining the estimated effect of BITs is lower and less robust than we would have expected 
based on our conceptual arguments (about 0.6 to 1.7%). For agriculture, coefficients point to an 
effect of 0.5 to 1.6%, but are not always found to be significantly different from zero. For 
manufacturing and services no impact of BITs was found. Especially given the political 
sensitivity and the history of expropriations in this sector, one would expect the result to be more 
similar to that of the utilities sector. Note that this might be related to the nature of our sample, 
which does not include major mineral or oil exporting countries. Moreover, mining in Eastern 
Europe mainly consists of coal mines, concentrated in a few countries
19
. The different nature of 
mineral mining in certain resource-rich African countries may result in a different reaction to 
BITs. Hence, for a sample including a larger number of countries with considerable natural 
resource endowments and mining opportunities, a stronger impact of BITs on mining 
investments may potentially be found. In this regard, it is interesting to note that in a study on the 
effectiveness of BITs for 83 developing host countries, Busse et al. (2010) find that the size of 
the BITs coefficient is lower when excluding the resource-intensive host countries. While the 
                                                     
19 Mining activities are mainly concentrated in Poland, Romania, Czech Republic and Ukraine and main 
resources extracted are mining of coal, oil, ore, manganese and gas.  
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authors of this study find this result surprising (they argue that the availability of natural 
resources should be such an important determinant of FDI that it would rule out the effect of a 
BIT), their finding actually supports our hypothesis that investments in the mining sector are 
particularly responsive to improved protection through BITs because of their high sensitivity to 
expropriation and policy reversals.  
Interacting the BIT variable with a proxy for sunk costs in each sector suggests that 
higher capital requirements at least partially explain FDI being more responsive to the signing of 
a BIT in certain sectors than in others; supporting the hypothesis that investment projects with a 
large degree of irreversibility are more sensitive to risk and more attractive for expropriation by 
the government and, as a result, more responsive to the protection provided by BITs. 
6 CONCLUSION 
Developing and transition countries have increasingly engaged in the signing of bilateral 
investment treaties in order to attract FDI, based on the widely shared view that FDI can 
contribute significantly to economic development and poverty reduction. However, the degree to 
which foreign investments can be expected to generate employment, offer access to international 
technology and know-how and ultimately create growth, varies considerably depending on the 
type of investment. As phrased in the most recent World Investment Report: “Policymakers 
should be aware of the different types [of foreign investment], each with distinct development 
impacts” and “the potential contribution of foreign investment [...] should guide investment 
policy and targeting effects” (UNCTAD, 2012a, p. 112-113). We therefore believe that it is 
important to understand not only whether bilateral investment treaties effectively succeed in 
attracting foreign investments, but also which types of investments they are able to attract. 
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Recently several studies have addressed the more general question on the effectiveness of 
BITs, but no study has looked into the potential heterogeneous effects that these treaties might 
have on different types of FDI. In this chapter we try to answer this second question by 
distinguishing the effect of BITs on investments in different economic sectors. We argue that 
BITs can be expected to be most effective in those sectors with large sunk costs, relatively low 
levels of firm-specific know-how and sectors that are politically sensitive to foreign ownership. 
Our empirical results confirm that especially for investments in the sectors of utilities and real 
estate, and to a lesser extent for banking and mining, BITs have a robust and economically 
significant effect on FDI stocks. For foreign investments in manufacturing and services, BITs 
seem not to play a major role in investment decisions.  
The small sample of countries in this study obviously limits the external validity of our 
findings. The impact of BITs on FDI in the mining sector may be very different in African 
countries with large amounts of FDI directed to the mining of high value minerals. Before 
extrapolating our results to other countries, a similar analysis on different and broader sets of 
countries would therefore be desirable. Nevertheless, we do think our results are important in 
that they are the first to point to a different impact of providing investment protection for 
different sectors of foreign investment. Given the considerable differences in the development 
impact to be expected from different types of FDI, our results question whether BITs are the 
most effective tool to attract those types of investments that are most beneficial for the 
development of the host economy. Finally, our results suggest that there is a strong need to better 
understand the heterogeneous effect of FDI across sectors on the host economy, and on the type 
of investments that are enhanced by policies aiming to attract foreign investments with the aim 
of stimulating economic development in developing countries.   
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FIGURES 
 
 
Figure 1. Sector shares in total FDI stock (1990 and 2010) and investor state disputes per 
sector (1987 – 2010) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on UNCTAD (2012b), IIA database for investor state 
disputes and UNCTAD’s WIR (2010) for data on sector shares in global FDI stock in 1990 and 
2010. 
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Figure 2a.  Fixed capital stock per firm (in logarithm) by sector (Germany, 1991-1997)  
The fixed capital stock per firm is calculated as the ratio of the real fixed capital stock (in million 
EUR) to the number of firms in each sector. 
Source: EU KLEMS (2011) 
 
 
Figure 2b. Capital-labor ratio, by sector (Germany, 1997-2007).  
The capital-labor ratio of each sector is calculated as the ratio of the real fixed capital stock (in 
million EUR) to the number of engaged persons (in thousands).  
Source: EU KLEMS (2011). 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1. Sector and Time Patterns of Expropriation Acts in Developing Countries: 1960-
2006 
 
 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-06 
      
Share in total expropriation acts  (%) 
Primaries 36.8 40.4 52.9 31.8 48.1 
Agriculture 8.8 8.7 36.3 0.0 11.1 
Mining 11.8 12.3 0.0 22.7 18.5 
Petroleum 16.2 19.4 17.6 9.1 18.5 
      
Manufacturing 25.7 27.4 23.5 13.6 14.8 
       
Services 37.5 31.4 23.5 54.5 37.0 
Banking  12.5 11.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Communication 1.5 2.4 0.0 0.0 7.4 
Trade 7.4 4.0 5.9 4.5 3.7 
Transportation 5.9 3.3 5.9 4.5 3.7 
Utilities 10.3 4.5 0.0 18.2 11.1 
Other services 0.0 3.8 11.8 18.2 11.1 
 
Total number of expropriation acts 
 136 423 17 22 27 
Taken from Hajzler (2012). Sources: Kobrin (1984), Minor (1994) and Hajzler (2012).   
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Table 2. Sector shares in total FDI stock for the countries in our sample (average over 
1994-2009) 
 
Sector 
Total inward FDI 
stock (million euros) 
Share in total FDI stock (%) 
 
Mean Mean Minimum Maximum 
Agriculture and Fisheries 115 0.8 0.1 2.2 
Banking 3,308 18.1 10.6 33.5 
Manufacturing 6,085 34.5 14.9 44.8 
Mining 271 1.3 0.1 5.1 
Private Services 4,181 26.8 5.4 18.8 
Real Estate 2,181 9.6 1.7 17.7 
Utilities 764 3.6 0.8 6.7 
Source: Author’s calculations based on WIIW (2010) 
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Table 3. Regression results: common BIT coefficient 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Static FE Dynamic 
FE 
Dynamic FE, 
country trends 
GMM GMM, BIT 
endogenous 
L.FDI stock, Ln  0.672*** 0.623*** 0.861*** 0.813*** 
 (0.0227) (0.0246) (0.101) (0.0763) 
BITs in force 0.0136*** 0.00931*** 0.0207*** 0.0109*** 0.0179 
 (0.00615) (0.00417) (0.00876) (0.00444) (0.0163) 
Monthly wage, 
Ln 
0.560*** 0.433*** 0.221 0.392*** 0.456*** 
(0.192) (0.148) (0.212) (0.159) (0.191) 
Inflation (%), Ln -0.00813 0.0277 -0.0104 0.0526*** 0.0484** 
 (0.0328) (0.0219) (0.0254) (0.0261) (0.0258) 
Political 
Constraints 
0.636*** 0.207 0.0573 0.119 0.186 
(0.258) (0.174) (0.193) (0.191) (0.202) 
Trade (%GDP), 
Ln 
0.613*** 0.417*** 0.447** 0.394*** 0.436*** 
(0.251) (0.172) (0.242) (0.185) (0.188) 
Observations 933 853 853 745 745 
Country-sector 
fixed effects 
Y Y Y Y Y 
 
Time dummies Y Y Y Y Y 
Country-time 
trends 
N N Y N N 
GMM lag 
structure 
   lags (2-4) lags (2-4) 
Number of 
instruments 
   22 24 
AR(2)  
(p-value) 
   0.68 
(0.528) 
0.60 
(0.552) 
Sargan test  
(p-value) 
   0.16 
(0.925) 
6.33 
(0.176) 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.15, 
**
 p < 0.10, 
***
 p < 0.05 
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Table 4. Regression results: separate BIT effect for each sector 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Static FE Dynamic 
FE 
Dynamic FE, 
country 
trends 
GMM GMM, BIT 
endogenous 
L.FDI stock, Ln  0.654*** 0.590*** 0.839*** 0.780*** 
 (0.0232) (0.0254) (0.0965) (0.0676) 
BITs* 
Agriculture 
0.00155 0.00460 0.0163* 0.00739 0.0169 
(0.0101) (0.00778) (0.0110) (0.00876) (0.0159) 
BITs*      
Banking 
0.0201*** 0.00857* 0.0231*** 0.00914* 0.0179 
(0.00796) (0.00567) (0.00933) (0.00608) (0.0139) 
BITs* 
Manufacturing 
-0.0127* -0.000130 0.0123 0.00521 0.00805 
(0.00795) (0.00569) (0.00931) (0.00644) (0.0144) 
BITs*        
Mining 
0.00511 0.00612 0.0174* 0.0110 0.0137 
(0.00946) (0.00724) (0.0106) (0.00793) (0.0149) 
BITs* Real 
Estate 
0.0479*** 0.0160*** 0.0335*** 0.0104* 0.0235** 
(0.00810) (0.00589) (0.00973) (0.00712) (0.0143) 
BITs*      
Services 
-0.00507 0.000807 0.0137* 0.00532 0.00765 
(0.00796) (0.00568) (0.00930) (0.00617) (0.0142) 
BITs*       
Utilities 
0.0309*** 0.0253*** 0.0412*** 0.0262*** 0.0312*** 
(0.00861) (0.00613) (0.00987) (0.00649) (0.0144) 
Monthly wage, 
Ln 
0.538*** 0.401*** 0.224 0.371*** 0.429*** 
(0.185) (0.147) (0.209) (0.156) (0.174) 
Inflation (%), Ln -0.0100 0.0269 -0.0179 0.0509*** 0.0474** 
 (0.0316) (0.0217) (0.0250) (0.0256) (0.0252) 
Political 
Constraints 
0.643*** 0.209 0.0716 0.125 0.192 
(0.249) (0.173) (0.190) (0.187) (0.190) 
Trade (%GDP), 
Ln 
0.624*** 0.394*** 0.463** 0.371*** 0.421*** 
(0.242) (0.171) (0.238) (0.182) (0.181) 
Observations 933 853 853 745 745 
Country-sector 
fixed effects 
Y Y Y Y Y 
 
Time dummies Y Y Y Y Y 
Country-time 
trends 
N N Y N N 
GMM lag 
structure 
   lags (2-4) lags (2-4) 
Number of 
instruments 
   28 42 
AR(2)  
(p-value) 
   0.49 
(0.521) 
0.45 
(0.650) 
Sargan test  
(p-value) 
   0.36 
(0.834) 
14.44 
(0.566) 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.15, 
**
 p < 0.10, 
***
 p < 0.05 
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Table 5. Regression results: BIT variable interacted with sunkness using capital-per-firm 
proxy.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Static FE Dynamic FE Dynamic FE, 
country trends 
GMM GMM, BIT 
endogenous 
FDI stock, Ln  0.662*** 0.607*** 0.841*** 0.807*** 
  (0.0226) (0.0245) (0.102) (0.0782) 
BITs in force 0.0139*** 0.00930*** 0.0229*** 0.0109*** 0.0223
 
 (0.00606) (0.00413) (0.00866) (0.00438) (0.0160) 
BIT*Sunkness 1.163*** 0.648*** 0.733*** 0.518*** 0.710*** 
(0.227) (0.164) (0.162) (0.189) (0.324) 
Monthly wage, Ln 0.534*** 0.406*** 0.202 0.377*** 0.461*** 
 (0.189) (0.147) (0.209) (0.156) (0.189) 
Inflation (%), Ln -0.0103 0.0272 -0.0160 0.0516*** 0.0468** 
 (0.0323) (0.0217) (0.0251) (0.0257) (0.0257) 
Political 
Constraints 
0.642*** 0.208 0.0710 0.128 0.210 
(0.255) (0.173) (0.190) (0.189) (0.202) 
Trade (% GDP), Ln 0.585*** 0.389*** 0.453** 0.376*** 0.419*** 
 (0.248) (0.170) (0.239) (0.182) (0.187) 
Observations 933 853 853 745 745 
Country-sector 
fixed effects 
Y Y Y Y Y 
 
Time dummies Y Y Y Y Y 
Country-time 
trends 
N N Y N N 
GMM lag structure    lags (2-4) lags (2-4) 
Number of 
instruments 
   23 27 
AR(2)  
(p-value) 
   0.52 
(0.603) 
0.44 
(0.657) 
Sargan test  
(p-value) 
   0.32 
(0.854) 
11.50 
(0.074) 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.15, 
**
 p < 0.10, 
***
 p < 0.05.  
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Table 6. Regression results: Robustness tests with alternative BIT variables (1-4) and 
manufacturing industries (5) 
 
 Dynamic FE, country 
trends (BITs signed) 
Dynamic FE, country 
trends (BITs with top 15 
capital exporters) 
Dynamic FE, country 
trends (Manufacturing 
industries) 
L.FDI stock, Ln 0.610*** 0.624*** 0.611*** 0.622*** 0.590*** 
 (0.0256) (0.0247) (0.0252) (0.0245) (0.0227) 
BIT* Agriculture -0.000339  0.0147   
(0.0131)  (0.0299)   
BIT* Banking 0.00463  0.0301*   
 (0.0108)  (0.0206)   
BIT* 
Manufacturing 
-0.00707  0.00475   
(0.0108)  (0.0205)   
BIT* Mining -0.000538  0.0380   
 (0.0125)  (0.0303)   
BIT* Real Estate 0.0137  0.0478***   
(0.0110)  (0.0217)   
BIT* Services -0.00568  0.00695   
 (0.0108)  (0.0205)   
BIT* Utilities 0.0131  0.0842***   
(0.0113)  (0.0235)   
BITs  0.00320  0.0309 0.00639 
  (0.00984)  (0.0261) (0.00621) 
BITs*Sunkness  0.533***  2.615*** 0.250*** 
 (0.193)  (0.746) (0.122) 
Monthly wage, 
Ln 
0.328* 0.312* 0.365** 0.354** 0.273* 
(0.208) (0.207) (0.209) (0.211) (0.174) 
Inflation (%), Ln 0.00141 0.00242 -0.00172 0.00190 0.00607 
(0.0247) (0.0247) (0.0244) (0.0244) (0.0183) 
Political 
Constraints 
-0.00789 -0.00946 0.00988 -0.0170 0.123 
(0.191) (0.191) (0.189) (0.189) (0.149) 
Trade (% GDP), 
Ln 
0.478*** 0.468** 0.473*** 0.440** 0.206 
(0.242) (0.242) (0.240) (0.242) (0.216) 
Observations 853 853 853 853 1156 
All specifications include country-sector fixed effects, time dummies and country-time trends. 
Standard errors in parentheses.  * p < 0.15, ** p < 0.10, *** p < 0.05. 
 
